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Law’s Knowledge and Law’s Effectiveness: Reflections from Legal 
Sociology and Legal Theory 
Peer Zumbansen* 
 
A. SOCIOLOGICAL VIEWPOINTS ON LEGAL SOCIOLOGY† 
With considerable regularity, the established and functioning scientific apparatus is able to 
reshape itself, to confirm or change its course and the respective lenses of observation through 
the rationalization of themes, trends and through the identification of individuals and groups of 
scholars who are being associated with these developments. This exercise, leaving its traces in 
conferences, edited volumes and the formation of scientific associations, is largely centred 
around the formulation, assessment and defence of scholarly projects and tasks. The importance 
of such undertakings lies, however, in their ability to never let the forces of institutionalization, 
formalization and bureaucratization take the upper hand over the continuing diversity and 
curiosity that reigns beneath their surface. The awarding of academic honours and prizes 
themselves are part of the institutionalization of scholarly projects, but they come with the 
calming realization that, despite all the festivity, it is clear to everyone that there is no one who 
deserves the prize. There is in fact no prize recipient. What remains is the constantly nagging 
doubt whether curiosity and critical inquiry still govern our search, whether ears and eyes 
continue to be open.  
The following observations focus on a number of well-known and recently emerging research 
challenges to the sociology of law. In this undertaking I am served by two reference points, one 
being the state, the other one being the market. The protagonists are Michael Kumpfmüller and 
Josef Ackermann, but also Theodor Baums. We are reading Kumpfmüller -the Berlin based 
novelist, the author and creator of Hampels Fluchten’1, Durst’2 and the recently published novel 
Nachricht an Alle’3-, because his themes are those of legal sociology. Particularly in Durst and 
* Prof. Dr. LL.M. (Harv.), lic. en dr. (Paris), Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Canada. Canada
Research Chair in the Transnational and Comparative Law of Corporate Governance. Associate Dean Research and 
Director, Critical Research Laboratory in Law & Society (www.criticalresearchlab.org). Email: 
Pzumbansen@osgoode.yorku.ca. 
† The paper is based on the author’s recipient lecture for the 2008 Law & Society Prize of the German-language 
Legal Sociology Association, awarded by the Christa-Hoffmann-Riem-Foundation on 5 September 2008 at the 
University of Lucerne, Switzerland. The Laudatio lecture was presented by Marc Amstutz (Université de Fribourg, 
Switzerland). The Laudatio and a shorter version of this paper are printed – in German – in 28 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE, 279-280 and 281-294 respectively. This Lecture is dedicated to Karl-Heinz Ladeur to his 65th 
birthday. The author is grateful to Sujith Xavier for helpful comments. 
1 MICHAEL KUMPFMÜLLER, HAMPELS FLUCHTEN (2002) 
2 MICHAEL KUMPFMÜLLER, DURST (2003) 
3 MICHAEL KUMPFMÜLLER, NACHRICHT AN ALLE (2008) 
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Nachricht, the author succeeds in providing us with an immensely poignant and inspiring view 
on the methodological challenges that we confront in our professional attempts at positioning the 
law today within and beyond the nation state. Another figure, well worthy of our attention is 
Theodor Baums, a banking and corporate law professor at Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University 
in Frankfurt, who some years ago presided over a governmental expert commission on Corporate 
Governance.4 Finally, then, we are well advised to consider Josef Ackermann, the Swiss-born 
banker who since 2002 has been leading the Deutsche Bank in Frankfurt. The study of these 
personalities promises a number of lessons about the development of the market, its relation to 
the state and the role of the law.  
 
B. LAW’S EFFECTIVENESS: COMPARATIVE GLIMPSES 
 
State and Market, Kumpfmüller, Baums and Ackermann: the central legal-sociological question 
raised in this constellation is about the effectiveness of law. This well-known question5 remains 
of great importance still today.6 And yet, the sheer wealth of scientific research and 
methodological contestation surrounding the issue of law’s effectiveness only underscores the 
distance between scholarly innovation and the current, far-reaching absence of legal sociological 
work in today’s law school curricula. In spite of an arduous production of scholarship and 
discourse at symposia, roundtables and dedicated research centres in legal sociology7, the field 
appears esoteric and, at best, irrelevant to today’s law students in dire need of ‘skill training’ and 
practical instruction.8  In the current climate, there is indeed little reason to think, expect and 
even less to hope that most law students at the time of graduation would have had a meaningful 
exposure to legal sociological investigations of the sources of law, the effectiveness and the 
contested boundaries of law:9 along with philosophy of law, legal theory and legal history, the 
sociology of law is among the very rarely found fields of instruction in contemporary legal 
curricula. 
                                                
4 Theodor Baums, Empfiehlt sich eine Neuregelung des aktienrechtlichen Anfechtungs- und Organhaftungsrechts, 
insbesondere der Klagemöglichkeiten von Aktionären?, GUTACHTEN VOR DEM 63. DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAG IN 
LEIPZIG, Leipzig, DJT (2000) ; Theodor Baums, Interview: Reforming German Corporate Governance: Inside a 
Law Making Process of a very new nature, 2 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL at: 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/past_issues.php? id=43 (2001). 
5 Manfred Rehbinder/Helmut Schelsky (Ed.), ZUR EFFEKTIVITÄT DES RECHTS, 1972. 
6 ‚Wie Wirkt Recht?’ Interdisziplinäre Rechtsforschung zwischen Rechtswirklichkeit, Rechtsanalyse und 
Rechtsgestaltung. 1. Congress of the German-language Associations in Legal Sociology (Germany – Austria – 
Switzerland) 4-6 September 2008, University  of Lucerne. 
7 http://www.isa-sociology.org/rc12_sociolegal.htm  
8 See, for example, http://legalscholarshipblog.com/2008/12/08/technology-ethics-and-the-practice-of-law-training-
the-21st-century-law-student-san-diego-2/; see also the recently reformed third-year program at Washington & Lee 
University School of Law, focusing entirely on practical instruction, contract drafting and mediation: 
http://law.wlu.edu/thirdyear/ 
9 See for example, the contemplation by Danny Priel, Boundaries of Law and the Purpose of Legal Philosophy, Law 
and Philosophy 2008/2009, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1086389. 
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In 1935, Karl Llewellyn voiced an elaborate critique against himself and his colleagues for 
having only the faintest clue of what it was they were really teaching their students, given that 
they had no understanding of the legal practice students were entering after graduation.10 It was a 
challenging path that Llewellyn and some of his contemporaries had been embarking on, a path 
that would take them towards a more solid engagement in their research with empirical data11 on 
the one hand, and while pursuing a relentless demystification of legal formalism on the other.12 
Retrospectively, we might say that the Realists’ engagement and critique eventually unfolded in 
a considerable normalization – “We are all Realists now“13. But we are also advised to remain 
mindful how Legal Realism had to struggle with the polemical critique that posited that the 
Realists’ embrace of empiricism had allegedly led them to hold crude, theory-bare reality views. 
This tension that unfolded around a number of heated exchanges14 is (we should underline 
however), only too reflective of the field’s ambitious endeavour: the ongoing methodological 
inquiries into the foundations and orientations of legal sociological work are a strong testimony 
of the fact that legal sociology, much like any other ‘foundational’ field in law, continues to 
evolve.15 
 
This perspective on the evolution of legal realism and ‘law and society’ in the Anglo-American 
and Anglo-Saxon context finds important correlatives in Western Europe: the Western Welfare 
State made extremely ambitious demands of the legal system, the lawyers in the legislature, the 
judiciary and the administrations required sensibility to a constantly changing legal reality.16 It is 
no surprise that the realization “We are all Realists” is uttered today in a state of considerable 
exhaustion and sobriety. Acutely, Habermas in the mid-1980s observed a crisis of the Welfare 
                                                
10 Karl Llewellyn, On What is Wrong With So-Called Legal Education, 35 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 651 (1935) 
11 KARL N. LLEWELLYN & EDWARD ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN 
PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE (1941); see also JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL 
SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995); Neil Duxbury, Legal Realism for Legal Realists, 9 RATIO JURIS 198 (2007). 
12 Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence: The Next Step, 30 COLUMBIA L. REV. 431–475 (1930); Karl 
Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism, 44 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 1222 (1931). 
13 Joseph W. Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 465 (1988): 465, 467. 
14 Roscoe Pound, The Call for a 'Realist' Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 706 (1931); Llewellyn, 1930, 1931, 
supra note? 
15 See, for example, Richard A. Posner, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic Analysis of Law, 27 J. 
LEGAL STUDIES 553 (1998); David Nelken/Johannes Feest (Ed.), ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES, 2001; ROGER 
COTTERELL, SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON LAW (2001); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF 
LAW AND SOCIETY (2001); HANS-ALBRECHT HESSE, EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE (2004); THOMAS 
RAISER, GRUNDLAGEN DER RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE, 4. Aufl. (2007); MANFRED REHBINDER, RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE, 6. 
Aufl. (2007). 
16 NIKLAS LUHMANN, POLITICAL THEORY IN THE WELFARE STATE [1981, transl. by John Bednarz Jr.] (1990); Peer 
Zumbansen, Law After the Welfare State: Formalism, Functionalism and the Ironic Turn of Reflexive Law, 56 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 769 (2008). 
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State and the exhaustion of utopian energies.17 And as such, it comes as no surprise that the 
efforts made towards a resurrection of legal sociology occurred during the last days of the 
Welfare State, that had once so ambitiously entered the stage of legal, political, economic and 
social regulation. Its emergence is intimately connected to the questions surrounding the fate and 
prospects of law. In the European context, this question was neither asked nor was an answer 
attempted without a reference to the state.18 The welfare state differed from the social state in 
that it no longer merely sought to identify and to respond to ‘social problems’ but instead set out 
to resolve them as part of a comprehensive mandate of social engineering.19 Today, 
predominantly under the pressure of the transnationalization of human affairs, the law-state 
nexus has become extremely porous and contested, something that legal sociologists had 
certainly extrapolated already a long time ago.20 Then and now, law is apparently caught 
between either claiming its autonomous nature or by incessantly constructing its character 
through a historically informed reflection on the ebbs and flows of social regulation and state-
originating legal intervention.21 It is this champ de travail that opens in the late 1970s and early 
1980s in Europe and from which many long-lasting impulses will emanate into, for example, 
present day discussions around delegated powers and the legitimacy of private ordering.22 
 
While the emerging concepts of “procedural“23 and “reflexive law”24 in German legal theoretical 
and sociological debates and of “responsive law“ in the U.S25 discourse share some overlapping 
                                                
17 Jürgen Habermas, The New Obscurity: The Crisis of the Welfare State and the Exhaustion of Utopian Energies 
[1985], in: The New Conservatism. Cultural Criticism and the Historians' Debate [ed. and transl. by Shierry Weber 
Nicholsen] 48 (Habermas Ed. 1989). 
18 GRALF-PETER CALLIESS, PROZEDURALES RECHT (1999); PEER ZUMBANSEN, ORDNUNGSMUSTER IM MODERNEN 
WOHLFAHRTSSTAAT. LERNERFAHRUNGEN ZWISCHEN STAAT, GESELLSCHAFT UND VERTRAG (2000); CHRISTOPH 
MÖLLERS, STAAT ALS ARGUMENT (2000). 
19 NIKLAS LUHMANN, POLITISCHE THEORIE IM WOHLFAHRTSSTAAT (1981); Niklas Luhmann, Metamorphosen des 
Staates, in: LUHMANN, GESELLSCHAFTSSTRUKTUR UND SEMANTIK. STUDIEN ZUR WISSENSSOZIOLOGIE DER 
MODERNEN GESELLSCHAFT 101 (1995). 
20 EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (orig. published in German as 
Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts, 1913) (1962). 
21 Rudolf Wiethölter, Die Wirtschaftspraxis als Rechtsquelle, in: Das Rechtswesen - Lenker oder Spiegel der 
Gesellschaft? 165 (Bockelmann Ed. 1971); Rudolf Wiethölter, Privatrecht als Gesellschaftstheorie?, in: 
FUNKTIONSWANDEL DER PRIVATRECHTSINSTITUTIONEN. FESTSCHRIFT FÜR LUDWIG RAISER ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 
645 (Baur/Esser/Kübler/Steindorff Ed. 1974); Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Gesetzesinterpretation, 'Richterrecht' und 
Konventionsbildung in kognitivistischer Perspektive: Handeln unter Ungewissheitsbedingungen und richterliches 
Entscheiden, 77 ARCHIV FÜR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 176 (1981); Gunther Teubner, Reflexives Recht, 68 
ARSP 13 (1982) (engl.: Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 LAW AND 
SOCIETY REVIEW 239 (1983)]. 
22 See, for example, GREGOR BACHMANN, PRIVATE ORDNUNG (2006); Johannes Köndgen, Privatisierung des 
Rechts. Private Governance zwischen Deregulierung und Rekonstitutionalisierung, 206 ACP 477 (2006). 
23 Rudolf Wiethölter, Proceduralization of the Category of Law, in: CRITICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: AN AMERICAN-
GERMAN DEBATE 501 (Joerges/Trubek Ed. 1985); CALLIESS (1999), supra. 
24 Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 LAW AND SOCIETY REVIEW 239 (1983). 
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concerns regarding both law’s effectiveness and boundaries.26 Their ensuing trajectories appear 
to have proceeded in less parallel fashion. German legal theorists and sociologists appeared to 
have worked in the wake of Weber’s observation that ’the world is disenchanted’27, and from 
then on the progression of legal thought had to move through a brief but ardent positivism v. 
natural law-debate after the War28 on to Rule-of-Law v. Social/Welfare State-discussions in the 
1950s and 1960s29 onwards to numerous differentiations of legal regulation in a powerfully 
unfolding pluralistic, post-industrial society.30 In face of this breath-taking evolution of law as an 
integral part of political, social and economic change, it could ever less be understood as a meta-
program deriving its legitimacy from a comprehensive and unified normative framework, but 
instead as one among other contestable rationality forms in society. Nowhere has this argument 
been put forward in more radical fashion than in Niklas Luhmann’s early sociology of law, 
spelling out in nuce the research program and the concept of society in Systems Theory.31 
Standing on systems theoretical grounds, the concept of reflexive lawthat  historically emerged 
during an important and challenging period unfolding between 1968 and the end of the social-
liberal coalition in Bonn with an ardent debate about West German identity, international 
security politics, U.S.-German relations erupting around the stationing of Pershing and Cruise 
Missile rockets in Germany by U.S. military in the early 1980s, early on confronted a number of 
substantive critiques. The range of these contestations included, from the left, the recognition of 
the concept as representing an anti-emancipatory affirmation of the status quo32 to, in theoretical 
terms, the contention of reflexive law rendering a soft and not sufficiently stringent application 
                                                                                                                                                       
25 PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE (1969). 
26 David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, WISC. L. REV. 720 (1972); Teubner (1983), supra; 
Rudolf Wiethölter, Social Science Models in Economic Law, in: CONTRACT AND ORGANISATION. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
IN THE LIGHT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL THEORY 52 (Daintith/Teubner Ed. 1986). 
27 Weber, Science as Vocation, in: FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY (H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, 
translated and ed., 1946), 129-156, available online at: 
http://www.ims.demokritos.gr/people/tbou/Weber_Science_as_ Vocation.pdf  
28 Gustav Radbruch, Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht, 1 SJZ 105 (1946); Stanley L. Paulson, On the 
Background and Significance of Gustav Radbruch's Post-War Papers, 26 OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 17 
(2006). 
29 On the one hand: Ernst Forsthoff, Begriff und Wesen des sozialen Rechtsstaates, 12 VERÖFFENTLICHUNGEN DER 
VEREINIGUNGEN DER DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTSLEHRER 8 (1954); on the other: Rudolf Wiethölter, Die Position 
des Wirtschaftsrechts im sozialen Rechtsstaat, in: WIRTSCHAFTSORDNUNG UND RECHTSORDNUNG, FESTSCHRIFT FÜR 
FRANZ BÖHM ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 41 (Coing/Kronstein/Mestmäcker Ed. 1965). 
30 Dieter Grimm, Reformalisierung des Rechtsstaatsprinzips als Demokratiepostulat, 20 JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG 
[JUS] 704 (1980); Rüdiger Voigt (Ed.), VERRECHTLICHUNG, 1980. 
31 NIKLAS LUHMANN, RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE (1980), 3. Aufl. (1987) [Engl.: NIKLAS LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL 
THEORY OF LAW (1985)]. 
32 Joachim Nocke, Autopoiesis - Rechtssoziologie in seltsamen Schleifen, 19 KJ 363 (1986); Ingeborg Maus, 
Perspektiven "reflexiven Rechts" im Kontext gegenwärtiger Deregulierungstendenzen, 19 KJ 390 (1986); Erhard 
Blankenburg, The Poverty of Evolutionism: a critique of Teubner's case for 'reflexive law', 18 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 
273 (1984). 
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of the theory of autopoiesis to the field of law.33 As governance challenges continued to accrue 
under the pressure of Europeanization34 and Internationalization35 of a fast-evolving post-
industrial society, this was reflected in an intensification of legal theoretical and legal 
sociological work altogether showing a continuous expansion of legal imagination beyond a 
traditional state-based doctrinal focus towards ambitiously interdisciplinary deconstructions of 
law’s boundaries.36 
 
In the U.S., this process remained less tarnished by imminent pressures on its political 
sovereignty understanding that would compare to those facing the EC37 and, eventually, EU 
member states. Legal debates have long been characterized by the tandem of pronounced battles 
over civil liberties on the one hand and federalism on the other – often times almost 
indistinguishably so.38 Seen through the lens of power struggles, identified under a lens of 
separation of powers or, to a pluralistic diverse society, assessments of the effectiveness of law 
                                                
33 Niklas Luhmann, Einige Probleme mit "reflexivem Recht", 6 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 1 (1985); 
Niklas Luhmann, Some Problems with Reflexive Law, in: STATE, LAW AND ECONOMY AS AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEMS 
389 (Teubner/Febbrajo Ed. 1992); for reflections on Teubner’s influence on legal theory, see the contributions to 
Gralf-Peter Calliess/Andreas Fischer-Lescano/Dan Wielsch/Peer Zumbansen (Ed.), SOZIOLOGISCHE JURISPRUDENZ. 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR GUNTHER TEUBNER ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG, 2009 
34 See generally: KARL-HEINZ NARJES, DIE EUROPÄISIERUNG DES RECHTS (1987); Hans-Werner Rengeling (Ed.), 
EUROPÄISIERUNG DES RECHTS: RINGVORLESUNG ANLÄßLICH DES ZEHNJÄHRIGEN BESTEHENS DES INSTITUTS FÜR 
EUROPARECHT DER UNIVERSITÄT OSNABRÜCK 1995, 1996; for public law: VOLKER BOEHME-NEßLER, 
EUROPÄISCHES RICHTLINIENRECHT WANDELT DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSRECHT: EIN BEITRAG ZUR EUROPÄISIERUNG 
DES DEUTSCHEN RECHTS (1994); see the deliberations at the annual conventions of the Vereinigung der Deutschen 
Staatsrechtslehrer, for example: FÖDERALISMUS ALS NATIONALES UND INTERNATIONALES ORDNUNGSPRINZIP 
(1962); BEWAHRUNG UND VERÄNDERUNG DEMOKRATISCHER UND RECHTSSTAATLICHER VERFASSUNGSSTRUKTUR IN 
DEN INTERNATIONALEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN (1964); DER VERFASSUNGSSTAAT IM GEFLECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN 
BEZIEHUNGEN (1977); DER VERFASSUNGSSTAAT ALS GLIED EINER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT (1991); for 
private law see, for example, Christoph Weber (Ed.), EUROPÄISIERUNG DES PRIVATRECHTS: ZWISCHENBILANZ UND 
PERSPEKTIVEN. MAINZER TAGUNG, 10 - 13 SEPTEMBER 1997 DER GESELLSCHAFT JUNGER 
ZIVILRECHTSWISSENSCHAFTLER, 1997; GERT BRÜGGEMEIER, HAFTUNGSRECHT: STRUKTUR, PRINZIPIEN, 
SCHUTZBEREICH: EIN BEITRAG ZUR EUROPÄISIERUNG DES PRIVATRECHTS (2006); Christian Joerges, The Challenges 
of Europeanization in the Realm of Private Law: A Plea for a New Legal Discipline, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 
149 (2004). 
35 STEPHAN HOBE, DER OFFENE VERFASSUNGSSTAAT ZWISCHEN SOUVERÄNITÄT UND INTERDEPENDENZ: EINE STUDIE 
ZUR WANDLUNG DES STAATSBEGRIFFS DER DEUTSCHSPRACHIGEN STAATSLEHRE IM KONTEXT INTERNATIONALER 
INSTITUTIONALISIERTER KOOPERATION (1998); UDO DI FABIO, DAS RECHT OFFENER STAATEN (1998); UDO DI 
FABIO, DER VERFASSUNGSSTAAT IN DER WELTGESELLSCHAFT (2001). 
36 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Gesetzesinterpretation, "Richterrecht" und Konventionsbildung in kognitivistischer 
Perspektive, 77 ARCHIV FÜR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 176 (1991); KARL-HEINZ LADEUR, POSTMODERNE 
RECHTSTHEORIE (1992); KARL-HEINZ LADEUR, DAS UMWELTRECHT DER WISSENSGESELLSCHAFT (1995). 
37 See only Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, YALE LAW JOURNAL 2403 (1991). 
38 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Romer 
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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circled around matters of access to justice39, issues of equality, distribution, and identity40 or the 
transformation of the political-legal system.41 
 
Here and there, not least under the impression of persistently mobilized claims by legal 
sociologists, anthropologists and theorists regarding the importance of disentangling the legal 
system from either pre-existing or alternative modes of social ordering42, legal doctrine 
eventually began to embrace concepts of law developed neither out of the authority of the state 
nor on the grounds of a coherent normative framework.43 Many of the German anxieties about 
the failure of the Welfare State did not directly echo in the U.S., where the debate continued to 
evolve more around the tension between form (rules) and substance (standards), boiling down in 
the end to the question whether it should be in the judge’s discretion to make law.44 In 1976, 
Duncan Kennedy noted: “[T]he social engineering approach has not produced convincing results 
beyond the confines of particular fields. Generalizations that at first seem highly plausible turn 
out on further examination to be false, or at least no more convincing than diametrically opposed 
counter principles.”45 While more recent iterations of such contestations only rarely make 
references to ‘legal pluralism’, they either tend to take on specialized arenas of social-legal 
theory46 or continue to confront hard lines in established areas.47 Characterizing the 
                                                
39 Marc Galanter, Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOCIETY 
REV. 95 (1974). 
40 On the one hand: Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (1973); on the other: Duncan Kennedy, 
Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and 
Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MARYLAND L. REV. 563 (1982); Carole Pateman, The Patriarchal Welfare State, in: 
DEMOCRACY AND THE WELFARE STATE 231 (Gutman Ed. 1988), onwards to IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE 
POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990), and ELIZABETH FRAZER/NICOLA LACEY, THE POLITICS OF COMMUNITY. A 
FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF THE LIBERAL-COMMUNITARIAN DEBATE (1993). 
41 Richard B. Stewart, The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Administrative Regulation, 1985 
WISC. L. REV. 655 (1985); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 US 837 (1984); 
Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 Fla. St. U.L. Rev 155 (2000); Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal 
Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937 (2007). 
42 Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: the semi-autonomous field as an appropriate subject of study, 7 LAW 
& SOCIETY REVIEW 719 (1973); Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOCIETY REVIEW 869 (1988); Marc 
Galanter, Justice in many rooms: Courts, Private Ordering and Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEG. PLURALISM 1 (1981). 
43 Then: Rudolf Wiethölter, Artikel Bürgerliches Recht, in: HANDLEXIKON ZUR RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 47 (Görlitz 
Ed. 1972); Rudolf Wiethölter, Begriffs- oder Interessenjurisprudenz - falsche Fronten im IPR und 
Wirtschaftsverfassungsrecht, in: INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT UND RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG IM AUSGANG DES 20. 
JAHRHUNDERTS 213 (Lüderitz/Schröder Ed. 1977); Today: KARL-HEINZ LADEUR, POSTMODERNE RECHTSTHEORIE 
(1992); KARL-HEINZ LADEUR, DAS UMWELTRECHT DER WISSENSGESELLSCHAFT (1995); Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Die 
Prozeduralisierung des Unternehmens, in: PRIVATRECHT IM "RISIKOSTAAT" 137 (Hart Ed. 1997).  
44 Probably one of the best analysis of the form-substance distinction has been provided by Duncan Kennedy, Form 
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976). 
45 Id., at 1704. 
46 See, for example, the work in legal geography by Nicholas Blomley, Landscapes of Property, in: THE LEGAL 
GEOGRAPHIES READER. LAW, POWER, AND SPACE 118 (Blomley/Delaney/Ford Ed. 2001), and Richard Ford, Law’s 
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contemporary debate, in slightly more accentuated form in the U.S. than in Germany, is a 
particular polarization of political and theoretical camps.48 An extremely prolific legal theoretical 
and political debate has thus grown out of the post-Realist Critical Legal Studies movement with 
its soon following differentiations into Feminist Legal Studies and Critical Race Theory, into 
Post-Colonial Studies, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law’ [TWAIL] and critical 
public international law developing in parallel with an immensely influential ‘prairie fire’ of the 
“Law & Economics” school. Indeed, as with the force of a prairie fire49 its adepts have taken 
charge of law school posts, judicial benches and curricula.  
 
C. LAW’S SOBRIETY 
 
These legal theoretical and legal sociological efforts to think of ’alternatives to law’ are 
intimately tied to a search for ‘alternative’ law.50 This, however, suggests an ability of doing 
things differently, of finding recognizable discernable solutions, instead of dismissing the project 
of legal regulation as futile from the start. Critical, political, alternative theories of law, then, 
have long been dealing with the polemical observation that they lack stringency and coherence, 
which makes them– due to their missive doctrinal solidity – eventually impractical. Not a nice 
situation! Even less, when it turns out that – extreme cases aside – despite an alternative, perhaps 
with a richer reasoning the case’s outcome would not necessarily always have to be a different 
one.51 Yet, those who believe that courts are either overburdened with cases, or that courts have 
neither the time nor the competence to adjudicate cases arising out of complex transactions, are 
                                                                                                                                                       
Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 843 (1999), or local government law: Gerald Frug, 
The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980). 
47 E.g., for corporate law: William W. Bratton, Welfare, Dialectic, and Mediation in Corporate Law, 2 BERKELEY 
BUS. L.J. 59 (2005); LAWRENCE E: MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY. HOW FINANCE TRIUMPHED OVER 
INDUSTRY (2007); for contract law: Roy Kreitner, Fear of Contract, 2004 WISC. L. REV. 429 (2004); ROY 
KREITNER, CALCULATING PROMISES. THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN AMERICAN CONTRACT DOCTRINE (2007); see 
also contributions in Symposium Issue “GOVERNING CONTRACTS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DIMENSIONS”, 14 IND. J. 
GLOB. LEG. STUD. 181-481 (2007) [Zumbansen, Guest Ed.] 
48 Thus the ones: PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE (1969); Marc Galanter, Why the 'Haves' 
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 95 (1974); so the others: 
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS. A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973). In retrospective perspective today: Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of 
Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000, in: THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 19 (Trubek/Santos Ed. 
2006); poignantly provocative today: ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000).  
49 Brian R. Cheffins, Corporations, in: THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 485 (Cane/Tushnet Ed. 2003). 
50 Then: Erhard Blankenburg/Ekkehard Klausa/Hubert Rottleuthner/Ralf Rogowski (Ed.), ALTERNATIVE 
RECHTSFORMEN UND ALTERNATIVEN ZUM RECHT, 1980; ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW 
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); Today: Sally Engle Merry, New Legal Realism and the Ethnography of 
Transnational Law, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 975 (2006); John N. Drobak (Ed.), NORMS AND THE LAW, 2006. 
51 Rudolf Wiethölter, Zur Argumentation im Recht: Entscheidungsfolgen als Rechtsgründe?, in: 
ENTSCHEIDUNGSFOLGEN ALS RECHTSGRÜNDE 89 (Teubner Ed. 1995). 
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likely to question whether anybody should be engaging in such scientific expounding of law and 
the politics of adjudication at all. 
 
Law as the labour of Sisyphus on the legal paradox could just possibly subside in purely 
pragmatic fashion, making room for common sense assessments of the solutions that situations 
call for. Such pragmatic, neo-formalistic approaches, however, stand in stark contrast to the 
depth and breadth of legal deconstructivist, legal sociological and theoretical insights gained 
over the last decades. Centrally, the currently dominating (neo-) formalist and (neo-)functionalist 
critique of adjudication hopes to make invisible the fact that underneath each legal case lies a 
social conflict, a real story, a human fate that the law must inevitably transgress and alienate in 
order to address it as a ‘legal’ issue.52 Yet, it has long been clear that such abstraction will 
inevitably turn into ’nonsense’ where its artificial nature is denied.53 Thus, on both sides of the 
political spectrum, citizens doubt and despair over law, finding it not to be ‘on top of the 
times’.54 But now, what? The economistic dismissal of law in the name of social self-regulation 
and market ordering that has been marking the last two decades, can easily be seen to make the 
same mistakes that legal formalism was guilty of some one hundred years ago. By relying on 
terminology to capture what in fact are deep-running, irreconcilable differences and conflicts, 
these scholars suggest that law should be substituted by ‘social norms’.55 Legal pluralism then, 
social norms now? Only, with different politics?56 Legal theory and legal sociology can only 
hope to make sense of this paradox by repositioning the question as to how these social norms 
differ from law as to one about why this distinction matters.  
 
On the political right, law is being purified, detached and neutralized because it is being held 
accountable for not being able to adequately respond to the hyperbolic demands of a complex, 
globally spanning market society. Somewhere on the left, law is still understood as a sticky 
substance that attaches itself to the course of the world as an empowering reminder of unattained 
business, of unfulfilled or repeatedly shattered hopes, of exclusion and exploitation. Given that 
law protects expectations through its formalized operationable structure, it tracks and records 
patterns of hope, experience and decisions. But on both sides, Weber’s disenchanted world fuses 
                                                
52 Gunther Teubner, Dealing With Paradoxes: Luhmann, Wiethölter, Derrida, in: PARADOXES AND 
INCONSISTENCIES IN LAW 41 (Perez/Teubner Ed. 2006); Gunther Teubner/Peer Zumbansen, Rechtsentfremdungen: 
Zum gesellschaftlichen Mehrwert des zwölften Kamels, 21 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 189 (2000). 
53 See already the critique by Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUMBIA 
LAW REVIEW 809 (1935). 
54 Rudolf Wiethölter, Die Wirtschaftspraxis als Rechtsquelle, in: DAS RECHTSWESEN - LENKER ODER SPIEGEL DER 
GESELLSCHAFT? 165 (Bockelmann Ed. 1971), S. 170. 
55 Robert E. Scott, The Death of Contract Law, 54 UTLJ 369 (2004); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 
(2000); see the brilliant discussion of earlier work in this field by David Charny, Illusions of a Spontaneous Order: 
'Norms' in Contractual Relationships, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1841 (1996); Stewart Macaulay, Relational Contracts 
Floating on a Sea of Custom? Thoughts about the Ideas of Ian Macneil and Lisa Bernstein, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 775 
(2000). 
56 For a much needed reflection, see Pierre Schlag, Spam Jurisprudence, Air Law, and the Rank Anxiety of Nothing 
Happening (A Report on the State of the Art), 97 GEORGETOWN L.J. 803 (2009), 804-807, 816-821. 
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into the legitimation crisis57 onwards into the eventually dawning post-modern realization of the 
centrality and fragility of knowledge.58 On the left, attempts are made to save law, either as 
procedural framework for societal deliberation59, a civil culture of disputes60 or in defence 
against its one-sided appropriation.61 It is against the paradox of the congruent methodologies of 
approaching the difference between law and non-law described above that today we deal with the 
uncertainty over the political orientations – their progressive or conservative nature – of projects 
such as those focusing on the ‘experimental society’, the ‘post-modern state’62, or the ‘global 
Bukowina’ with law caught up in transnational regime collisions.63 This is likely not a 
productive or appropriate line of questioning. The depiction of law as a social system with a 
particular rationality points to an altogether more complex and more problematic relationship 
between law and social reform projects that wish to instrumentalize law for their purposes. 
 
Today, we are all ‘Realists’ to the degree that we have learned to look skeptically at law’s 
abstractions and its alleged purity. But, we have also all become ‘Economists’, maybe more so: 
realizing the degree to which law in the process of Weber’s rationalistic disenchantment of the 
world and in Forsthoff’s neutralization of the industrial society64 has been depicted as a ‘serving’ 
one.65 We are indeed hard-pressed to accept the continuing and dominating force of economic 
rationality over other societal rationalities. When Rudolf Wiethölter in 1971 asked his audience 
to reflect on the way in which we might understand economic practice as a source of law, he did 
                                                
57 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS [orig. German 1973: Legitimationskrise im Spätkapitalismus] (1975). 
58 JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE [orig. French: La condition 
postmoderne, Éditions de Minuit, Paris 1979] (1984), 6. 
59 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, FAKTIZITÄT UND GELTUNG. BEITRÄGE ZUR DISKURSTHEORIE DES RECHTS UND DES 
DEMOKRATISCHEN RECHTSSTAATS (1992) [Engl.: Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms [transl. William 
Rehg] (1996)]. 
60 GÜNTER FRANKENBERG, DIE VERFASSUNG DER REPUBLIK. AUTORITÄT UND SOLIDARITÄT IN DER 
ZIVILGESELLSCHAFT (1996). 
61 Martti Koskenniemi, 'The Lady Doth Protest Too Much'. Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in International Law, 65 
MODERN LAW REVIEW 159 (2002). 
62 KARL-HEINZ LADEUR, DER STAAT GEGEN DIE GESELLSCHAFT (2006), Chapter V, A, B. 
63 Andreas Fischer-Lescano/Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the 
Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICHIGAN J. INT'L L. 999 (2004). 
64 See ERNST FORSTHOFF, DER STAAT DER INDUSTRIEGESELLSCHAFT (1971); Ernst Forsthoff, The Administration as 
Provider of Services (transl. from Der Staat der Daseinsvorsorge, 1938), in: WEIMAR. A JURISPRUDENCE IN CRISIS 
326 (Jacobson/Schlink Ed. 2000); for a discussion, see MICHAEL STOLLEIS, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAW IN 
GERMANY 1914-1945 (Thomas Dunlop transl.) (2004), 384-387; and PEER ZUMBANSEN, ORDNUNGSMUSTER IM 
MODERNEN WOHLFAHRTSSTAAT. LERNERFAHRUNGEN ZWISCHEN STAAT, GESELLSCHAFT UND VERTRAG (2000), 93-
126, and Florian Meinel, Review Essay - Ernst Forsthoff and the Intellectual History of German Administrative Law, 
8 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 785 (2007). 
65 Morton J. Horwitz, The Rise of Legal Formalism, 19 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 251 (1975); Duncan Kennedy, Legal 
Formality, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 351 (1973); David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, WISC. L. REV. 
720 (1972). 
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so in a particularly challenging manner.66 Well aware of the contemporary reliance on economic 
rationality as governing philosophy and also of the fact that it would take a 30 minutes lecture to 
convince his friends, but more than a lifetime to convince his enemies, he nevertheless used this 
opportunity to critically assess the ability of law and legal theory to adequately take into account 
societal conditions. Critiquing law’s crude appropriation of economic thinking, Wiethölter 
described the world inhabited by law (and by lawyers) as pre-scientific, pre-industrial and pre-
democratic. Wiethölter found law’s (and the lawyers’) pitiful condition to be the result partly of 
its (their) deafness to other scientific voices,  the lack of methodological toolkit necessary to 
confront the challenges of the 21st century as well as its (their) blissfully naïve trust in law being 
able, somewhere between state and society, to bring about freedom. To speak in this context of 
economic practice as a source of law, he found to be a call to arms as much as pure nonsense. 
This assessment resounds strikingly with today’s iterations of social norms and their alleged 
challenge to law. In their oppositional stance, much of the ‘law and norms’ (sic!) scholarship 
expresses little interest in what law and norms actually do have in common.67 
 
As ‘norms’ scholars lament, for example, the pitfalls of alleged consumer protectionist or equity-
driven adjudication as an expression of an activist judiciary or as inappropriate regulatory 
intervention, they highlight the promises of social norms, soft law or alternative forms of conflict 
resolution. This creation of these distinctions, however, prevents them from having to confront 
the deeply paradoxical nature of ‘law’ here and ‚norms’ there. This is regrettable as it severes  
the ties to a longstanding legal theoretical investigation into the nature of law, which has for a 
good part of history been an inquiry into the relationship between law and non-law. This history 
has (should have) taught us that ‘law’ must inevitably be concerned with the to-and-fro between 
form and substance, which is nothing else than the existential dispute between law and social 
norm. Based on these distinctions, we are presented with the choice between state and market, 
between law and norms, between state ‘intervention’ and societal self-regulation. This line of 
argument, however, ignores long-standing Legal Realist insights into the legal nature of markets 
and the relational nature of rights68, insights that are of greatest importance again today where 
calls for ‘more market’ or ‘tougher regulation’ resound strangely out-of-touch with the complex 
realities of post-Welfare State regulatory regimes. 
 
Where the scholar of systems theory soberly (or, disillusioned?) records the economy’s 
imperialist and hegemonic stronghold over society69, the critical legal scholar might wish to 
                                                
66 Rudolf Wiethölter, Die Wirtschaftspraxis als Rechtsquelle, in: DAS RECHTSWESEN - LENKER ODER SPIEGEL DER 
GESELLSCHAFT? 165 (Bockelmann Ed. 1971). 
67 Gillian K. Hadfield/Eric Talley, On Public versus Private Provision of Corporate Law, 22 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 
414 (2006); critically: GRALF-PETER CALLIESS/PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND RUNNING CODE: A 
THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW (forthcoming), 2009. 
68 Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POLITICAL SCIENCE 
QUARTERLY 470 (1923); Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8 (1927). 
69 Gunther Teubner, In the Blind Spot: The Hybridization of Contracting, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 51 
(2007). 
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continue to break this self-fulfilling prophecy.70 Eventually, however, both accept the challenge 
to reach beyond the self-immunization of the market as a given, neutral sphere of human 
interaction. Yet, while the former is likely to be unhappy, the latter is certain to despair in the 
face of complex societal, transnational conditions that place a particular sound-barrier before 
calls for a re-politicization of law. Today’s society does not allow for a straight-forward solution 
to ‘problems’. So, what to ‘do’ now? Read more? Run for office? Buy a motorcycle? 
 
D. KUMPFMÜLLER’S STATE 
 
Finally, we turn to Kumpfmüller and Ackermann. In Durst Kumpfmüller reports in bloodchilling 
soberness how a young single mother one hot summer afternoon abandons her two children in 
their locked bedroom, with a couple of picnic size juice boxes. The novella, which according to 
the backcover is based on a true story, tells how the woman spends the next days, how she goes 
shopping, meets her (abusive) lover and her girl friend, whom she informs that the children are 
with their grandparents. During these days her thoughts repeatedly recur to the many impressions 
and reminisces connected to the children, the unrelenting demands of caring for two children, 
their age-related quarels and their never-ending questions. But, she also thinks of how they might 
just now be sitting by the window awaiting her return, how they sleep or sit on the floor, drinking 
juice. The woman in the book entitled Durst (Thurst) is constantly drinking something. 
Apparently, she is always thursty. What for? A more fulfilled, happier life? A life without having 
to live with children from two different men in an appartment without much money? A life in 
which her lover would be sensitive and caring? A life, in which her mother would not equate the 
absence of a father and husband with the daugther’s personal failure? A life, in which her girl 
friend would not satisfy herself with the answers received, but would prompt the woman to speak 
about how things really are, the children, life? At the end of the book, the woman returns to the 
house, sits in the hallway outside her appartment door, where the police found the children to 
have died of thurst.  
 
What is this book concerned with? What is the law concerned with when addressing this event as 
a legal case? How can the law know what it needs to know to adequately connect the story in the 
book with the case it has to solve? Whose failure is it? The mother’s, the society’s (with the girl 
friend, the lover, the woman’s mother – living in the same appartment building, the neighbors as 
stand-ins), the state that remains ignorant of all protagonists until it is too late? What does the 
law know of all this? 
 
Kumpfmüller’s Nachricht an alle [News for Everyone], published in 2008, deals with the life of 
a (fictional) German politician, the Secretary of the Interior, by the name of Selden. Selden holds 
office in a time after September 11th – i.e. the present. While he is in the U.S. on an official visit, 
he receives a text message on his cellphone, sent to him by his daugther from a passenger airplne 
                                                
70 Upendra Baxi, Market Fundamentalisms: Business Ethics at the Altar of Human Rights, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
REVIEW 1 (2005). 
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on the way from Rome to Stockholm. In the message the daughter tells her father that her plane 
is about to crash. Only much later, indeed after Selden had to speak publicly about the possible 
causes and relevance of this accident, will it become known that the plane crash did not result 
from a terrorist attack. 
 
Selden is the Secretary of the Interior of a country with considerable social unrest, with political 
and economic strikes,  a country described as being in a climate of general uncertainty, some of 
which is likely to result of terrorism-related anxieties. As such, Selden is a familiar, 
contemporary character. On its face, the account of how Selden absolves one meeting, one press 
conference after another, raises the reader’s question how Selden – as a an office holder or as a 
private citizen – will deal with his anguish about the loss of his daugther, given that many expect 
from him an interpretation of the yet unknown causes of the air plane’s crash.  Will he as 
Secretary of the Interior argue for the need of heightened security in the face of a terrorist attack? 
Or, will he continue to carry on as before. And this raises the question when it all began – and 
when it might end. 
 
Kumpfmüller’s account of Selden’s actions and thoughts is nothing short of a masterful 
observation of law’s effectiveness. This law is being prepared in ministries, channelled through 
parliamentary assemblies and implemented. What are the goals that the law pursues? What is the 
knowledge on which the creation and implemenation of laws is based? Selden’s questions, which 
he ponders while he stares out of the windows of his office, become the questions of the state 
itself, of the state and its functioning – with or without the law. As such, they are society’s 
questions: Selden’s exhaustion in trying to find answers is paralleled by the state’s exhaustion in 
the absence of coherence, of starting and reference points. But, because he is the Secretary of the 
Interiror, sitting in his office while contemplating his life, he is the state contemplating itself. 
Selden and the state become artefacts, nodal points of a relentless, never-ending, non-hierarchial 
knowledge process – echoed in today’s administrative science’s depiction of the state’s 
dependence on and involvement in society’s generation of knowledge.71 
 
Is this story of the state’s exhaustion? A story about the end of the state? For better, or for worse? 
Are we asking the right questions? Selden, the Secretary of the Interior, knows these are the 
wrong questions. Or at maybe, they just have to be asked differently. If Selden’s exhaustion is 
not different from the state’s exhaustion, which is only a representation of society’s exhaustion, 
we keep going in circles. At the same time, this is the only way, it seems, to ask a question. By 
paralleling Selden’s exhaustion and questions with those of state and society, the author 
Kumpfmüller deprives everyone of a position of primacy or of occupying a privileged vantage 
point ‘with a view’. Selden’s exhaustion is the exhaustion of utopian Energies some thirty years 
ago when privatization came to substitute juridification, and contractualization began to sit side 
by side with administrative acts. Full employment then, September 11th today. Exhausted 
institutions, exhausted utopias. 
                                                
71 KARL-HEINZ LADEUR, POSTMODERNE RECHTSTHEORIE (1992); Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Der "Eigenwert" des Rechts - 
Die Selbstorganisationsfähigkeit der Gesellschaft und die relationale Rationalität des Rechts, in: DIE ZUKUNFT DES 
RECHTS 31 (Meier-Schatz Ed. 1998). 
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E. ACKERMANN’S MARKET 
 
Let us move away from the books and turn our attention to codes of conduct, best practices, 
recommendations and corporate governance codes. These are the law’s new text. We can study 
their emergence through the protagonists Josef Ackermann and Theodor Baums. The latter 
chaired the German federal government’s corporate governance commission between 2000 and 
2001 and prepared a comprehensive 300 pages report focusing on the needed repairs to the body 
of German stock corporation law with view to making it ‘globally competitive’. The central 
recommendation of his report to the Ministry of Justice was to convene a follow-up commission 
with the mandate of drafting a Corporate Governance Code. This code would have to connect 
tradition and revolution: on the one hand, the code, which was issued a mere year later72, in 
2002, would have to present the central features of the existing law to the foreign reader (and 
prospective investor) in a concentrated and accessible manner. In this respect, the Code contains 
a largely descriptive portion related to the existing law governing stock corporations. On the 
other hand, the Code includes a long list of recommendations and suggestions that tell a tale of 
the slowly but surely evolving transformation of the German ‘variety of capitalism’.73 On the 
small space of fourteen pages, the Code thus brings together hard and soft law, the law of today 
and, perhaps, of tomorrow.74 
 
The governing idea behind the Code is, admittedly, the creation of more transparency as well as 
the ‘soft’ governance of the market through a distinct form of inducing a publicly accountable 
self-regulation of German corporations adhering to the Code. If a corporation decides not to 
observe the recommendations of a Code, it must issue a statement to that effect in its annual 
report. The corporation is, however, not obliged to offer justifications. This is of great interest in 
the context of our inquiry into the ‘how’ of law’s effectiveness. The brief, largely academic 
debate regarding the legal nature of the Code, including the question whether or not already the 
Commission itself had lacked a constitutional mandate to engage in law-making,75  eventually 
                                                
72 http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/ 
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and Rhenish Capitalism, 3 GERMAN L. J. No. 6 (2002), available at: 
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74 Patrick C. Leyens, German Company Law: Recent Developments and Future Challenges, 6 GERMAN L. J. 1407 
(2005), available at: http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=645  
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subsided as the Legislator avoided any reference to this issue when it codified the corporations’ 
obligation to issue the annual statement regarding its compliance.76  
Under the watch of a standing commission and in the face of a relatively dynamic academic 
debate regarding the Code’s ‘success’, the Code has undergone a number of amendments over 
the years since its initial drafting. There is, to be sure, a continued lack of consensus with regard 
to the effectiveness of the Code as a means of (legal) regulation. Even with a growing number of 
adhering corporations, it is anything but clear whether there has been any ‘impact’, whether the 
Code has led to an improved standing of German corporations on global financial markets – a 
concern, certainly, that has been attaining yet an entirely more accentuated meaning in a context 
of dramatically scarce funds going around. This is aggravated by an underlying fundamental 
uncertainty about how to adequately measure the connection between a corporation’s observance 
of the Code’s soft law segments and its improved economic performance.  
 
Mr Baums himself has been playing a particularly interesting role in the afterlife of the Code. He 
found himself, having stepped down from chairing a highly renowned commission in never-
ending media and academic attention, increasingly entangled in a complex web of official and 
unofficial, hard and soft laws. When faced with the resistance of German leading managers 
against the Code’s plea to individually list the elements of executive compensation, Baums 
announced he would take this issue to Berlin, i.e. to lobby for the codification of this previously 
soft obligation. The train of the German economy’s self-regulation was thus rerouted, with the 
result of an admittedly altogether not convincing law ordaining the individual listing of board 
members’ compensation except where a qualified majority of shareholders chose to vote against 
this disclosure.77 What is the lesson learned? What does this tell us about law’s effectiveness? 
This question gains particular relevance where we remember that the original question always 
carried a critical component with it: the inquiry into law’s effectiveness is one that goes both 
ways. Inquiring into law’s effectiveness implies a critique of the means and the end. This story 
speaks of the ambiguities that surround the emergence of new, alternative forms of regulation 
and it is an account of the challenges and intricacies of institutionalizing alternative modes of 
legal governance in a highly codified and formalized civil law system. 
 
Arguably, then, the real hero of the transformation of German capitalism is Josef Ackermann. 
Assuming, in 2002, the role of Speaker and CEO of the Deutsche Bank, he left little doubt from 
the beginning as to his ambition to restructure the Board towards a the crucial role now occupied 
by himself. The French Le Monde promptly speculated about an eventual cultural revolution 
while German newspapers were no less imaginiative in their colourful picturing of the changes 
that would come of Ackermann’s tenure. While many expected that Josef Ackermann, an 
ambitous manager of decidedly global orientation, would take the lead in order to fill the role of 
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an authoritative CEO more than adhering to the existing collegial and consensual form of 
government prescribed by German stock corporation law, these concerns turned out to be 
somewhat unnecessary. Ackermann convened an executive committee, closely positioned around 
the Speaker, and this eventually resulted in a Group Executive Committee, consisting of 
members of the board but also of managers of other important business partners of the Bank. 
All’s well that ends well? What about the relationship between the board of managers and the 
supervisory board, especially in light of the important legislative changes brought about in the 
past in order to improve the level of control of the latter over the former?78 The Deutsche Bank 
appears to be in loyal observance of the Code and itself propagates an effective communication 
with the supervisory board.  
 
On its website, the Bank publishes a comprehensive report regarding its compliance with the 
Code and with other corporate governance principles it pursues. The level of (self)regulation is 
amplified to a degree that render the formal, official regulatory framework almost invisible. The 
Bank observes the Code, which itself is not law – as we are told by the drafting body – and it 
adheres to such corporate governance principles that have gained wide market accceptance. 
 
And, in July 2008, Josef Ackermann was appointed honorary professor at the University of 
Frankfurt. Moreover, three years before, his nomination was successfully resisted by a number of 
University members including the student council (ASTA). Now, at the time of his final 
appointment, several University officials lauded this event as a ‘successful integration of market 
and science’. Others commented on the appointment as a quid-pro-quo and as returned favors in 
light of the substantial financial gifts from the Bank to the University, in particular the banking 
and corporate law-focused Institute for Law and Finance.79 The German weekly, DER SPIEGEL, 
reported the  University’s Economics Department’s Dean, Wolfgang König, to have observed 
that ‘Ackermann was an expert, and his moral qualities were not at issue’. The Dean reportedly 
went on to say that Ackermann with his particular corporate policy had the interests of 
shareholders in mind, which itself was important teaching substance for students: ‘He does 
banking strategy, he does banking structure, and these fields cannot be debated without touching 
on shareholder value, which formed a part of the curriculum. The Director of the Institute of 
Social Institute [and successor of Jürgen Habermas at the Department of Philosophy – PZ], 
originally founded by Adorno and Horkheimer, Professor Axel Honneth, has no quarrel with this 
assessment. Yet the many connections and ties between the University and Deutsche Bank, 
including the newly built ‘House of Finance’ on the University’s new campus in the Westend of 
Frankfurt, co-financed by the Deutsche Bank, gave a somewhat stale taste to the fact that top 
managers of such important a sponsor received academic honorary titles.80 Students that were 
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interviewed back in February 2008, the year of Ackermann’s appointment regretted the reduction 
in course offerings in the area of social care, welfare and pensions insurance in contrast to the 
increased offers of finance oriented courses.  
 
This local example is hardly comprehensible without casting an eye to its transnational 
dimensions. The justifications offered by the Economics Dean can well be read as a reflection of 
a long-standing shifting of governance and subsistence balances between state and market. In 
contrast, the remarks of the Professor of Philosophy rings strangely helpless. In the face of such 
fast-changing relations between public and private and the pressure on actors on both sides, we 
are well advised to cast our view beyond the local context, into a world in which Niklas 
Luhmann raised the question whether it would still have any place (or role) of the law of the 
embedded national rule of law and welfare state.81 
 
F. TRANSNATIONAL LAW AS THE DEMISE OF ‘LEGAL GEOMETRY’?82 
 
We shall once more return to Habermas’ article83 on the crisis of the Welfare State and the 
exhaustion of utopian energies. Habbermas refers to the historian Reinhart Koselleck and his 
work on the new time consciousness that emerges in the 18th century:  
A consciousness of time and the future begins to develop in the shadows of absolutist politics, 
first in secret, later openly, sustained by an audacious combination of politics and prophecy. 
There enters into the philosophy of progress a typical eighteenth-century mixture of rational 
prediction and salvational expectation. Progress occurred to the extent that the state and its 
                                                                                                                                                       
nicht darum, seine moralischen Qualitäten zu bewerten, argumentiert Wolfgang König, Dekan des Fachbereichs 
Wirtschaftswissenschaften. Dass Ackermann mit seiner Unternehmenspolitik besonders die Interessen der Aktionäre 
im Blick habe, sei sogar wichtiger Lernstoff für die Studenten: ‘Er macht Bankenstrategie, er macht Bankenstruktur, 
er macht Kapitalmarktüberlegungen, und da spielen natürlich Fragen wie Shareholder value eine Rolle’, sagt 
König, "insofern ist das schon ein Teil des Ausbildungsprogramms. Das sei in Ordnung so, glaubt auch der 
Philosophieprofessor Axel Honneth, Leiter des von Adorno und Horkheimer gegründeten Instituts für 
Sozialforschung an der Goethe-Universität. Allerdings gebe es inzwischen vielfältige Verflechtungen zwischen der 
Uni und der Deutschen Bank, die zum Beispiel das neue "House of Finance" auf dem Campus Westend 
mitfinanziere. Wenn dann Spitzenmanager dieses wichtigen Sponsors akademische Ehren-Titel bekämen, hätte das 
einen schalen Beigeschmack.” [Engl. transl. PZ] 
81 NIKLAS LUHMANN, DAS RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT (1993), at 585 [Engl: THE LAW OF SOCIETY, 2004]. 
82 Marc Amstutz/Vagias Karavas, Rechtsmutation: Zu Genese und Evolution des Rechts im transnationalen Raum, 
RECHTSHISTORISCHES JOURNAL 14 (2006), at 15. 
83 Jürgen Habermas, The New Obscurity: The Crisis of the Welfare State and the Exhaustion of Utopian Energies 
[1985], in: THE NEW CONSERVATISM. CULTURAL CRITICISM AND THE HISTORIANS' DEBATE [ed. and transl. by 
Shierry Weber Nicholsen] 48 (Habermas Ed. 1989), at 9. 
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prognostication was never able to satisfy soteriological demands which persisted when a state 
whose own existence depended upon the elimination of millenarian expectations.84  
 
It is the dramatic realization of the unavaibility of the future and the doubtfulness of the nation-
state’s past in face of emerging transnational regulatory regimes that might explain the urgency 
with which scholars today are engaged in the design of legal architectures for world society. 
Such exercises have long been forced to shed their optimism and innocence: too overwhelming 
proves the realization of (the recurrence, continuation of) exclusion, violence and stratification.85  
 
And yet, the shadow of the state continues to loom large: the challenge amidst a dynamic debate 
over the future of international relations and international law86 continues to be the translation 
between the semantics of ‘law and politics’ developed within the nation-state onto the 
transnational arena. For the time being, the distinct quality of the ‘post-national constellation’87 
seems to block our view back to the learning experiences within the nation-state. In this 
constellation it might be of some merit to focus on the relations between the parallels amongst 
the legal theoretical and legal sociological methodological instruments that have been evolving 
inside and outside of the nation state, if only to realize that at the core lies a new understanding 
of society and of its law. This understanding would be grounded in the realization that society is 
a world society and that our learned ways in tracing the evolution of law, economics, the state 
and ‘society’ reflect the particular historical and cultural contexts and experiences out of which 
such accounts of society have been arising.88 Such an approach would not be justifiable on the 
basis alone of wanting to avoid a crude transfer of nation-state originating legal methodologies 
into the discourses around transnational regulatory regimes; rather, the realization of the 
importance of the local would not have to lead us to the preaching of a possibly desired return to 
a world before globalization, but instead the emerging project would be about a reconnection 
between the evolution of legal semantics in different places, times and spaces. In other words, it 
would be about the connection between critical investigations into the tension between the legal 
and non-legal space within a highly regulated, adjudicated and administered space89 on the one 
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hand and a seeminmgly more amorphous space on the other.90 From that perspective, we are 
likely to gain a better view on such fields that so far might have been the terrain of specialized 
discourses, including the transnationalization of labour movements and employment and 
workplace regulations91, migration and citizenship92, the transformation of actual and theoretical 
access and user conditionalities of educational facilities93 as well as questions arising from the 
administration of cities with regard to exclusion and inclusion of urban populations. Further 
fields that demand a more concentrated investigation into their transnational dimension between 
the local and the global are employment and corporate law as well as the connection between 
these mostly isolated discourses.94 With regard to ‘practical legal questions’95 or to the 
neverending need to justify interdisciplinary96 and methodological inquiry into legal doctrine97, it 
is obvious that there is much that legal sociology and theory have to offer. That legal sociology is 
‘in a crisis’98 might thus be somewhat exaggerated. But, at the same time, there is no compelling 
reason to assume that current reform processes in legal education were in fact whole- or even 
halfheartedly taking the hands that legal sociology and theory are extending into their direction. 
How come? 
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